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Abstract
Aligning finance to sustainability requires methodologies to price forward-looking climate
risks and opportunities in financial contracts and in investors’ portfolios. Traditional ap-
proaches to financial pricing models cannot incorporate the nature of climate risk (i.e. deep
uncertainty, non-linearity and endogeneity), and of financial risks (interconnectedness and
complexity). To fill this gap, we developed a transparent, science-based framework to as-
sess and price climate financial risks under uncertainty, the CLIMAFIN tool. It embeds
climate scenarios adjusted financial pricing models (for equity holdings, sovereign and cor-
porate bonds), climate scenarios conditioned risk metrics (such as the Climate Spread and
the Climate Value-at-Risk). These allow us to introduce forward-looking climate risk sce-
narios in the valuation of counterparty risk, in the probability of default and largest losses
on investors’ portfolios. This handbook is intended to support investors in the assessment
of forward-looking climate risks in their portfolios and in the identification of portfolios’ risk
management strategies, and financial supervisors in the analysis of risk exposures that could
have implications for systemic risk and in the design of prudential measures to mitigate such
risk.
Keywords: CLIMAFIN, forward-looking climate transition risk, climate deep uncertainty,
financial contracts, financial pricing models, Climate Spread, Climate Value at Risk
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1. Introduction
There is growing awareness among academics, practitioners and financial supervisors
of the fact that unmitigated climate change and a disorderly transition to a low-carbon
economy could affect the profitability of several economic activities and cause relevant losses
for investors’ portfolios (Carney 2015, NGSF 2018, Battiston et al. 2017).
Nevertheless, recent research highlighted that investors are not pricing yet climate-related
risks in their portfolios (Monasterolo and de Angelis 2019, Morana and Sbrana 2019, Ramelli
et al. 2018).
Since financial investors take decisions based on what they can measure, and their de-
cisions do influence (and are influenced by) the benchmark in their respective markets,
evaluating climate risks in financial contracts is crucial from an investors’ risk management
perspective, and for financial supervisors whose mandate is about preserving financial sta-
bility.
Main barriers that investors face in pricing climate-related financial risks are represented
by (i) the nature of climate risks (physical, transition), (ii) the poor understanding of existing
classifications to assess financial exposures to climate risks, (iii) the need to move from the
backward-looking nature of traditional financial risk assessment and of investors’ benchmarks
to the forward looking nature of climate risks, and (iv) the integration of forward looking
climate shocks in financial risk metrics and management approaches.
In this handbook, we show how the CLIMAFIN tool can guide a risk averse investor in in-
tegrating climate risks considerations in her counterparty credit and financial risk valuation
and probability of default, including new climate scenarios adjusted risk metrics (Climate
Value-at-Risk, Climate Spread). CLIMAFIN provides a transparent, science-based frame-
work to assess investors’ exposure to forward-looking climate risks and to price climate risks
in the value of their financial contracts and portfolios. This allows investors to align to
the recommendations of the Network for Greening the Financial System (2019) on climate
?This is a first version of a work in progress. The aim is report and discuss in a single document the
results of a stream of scientific works on the pricing of climate risk across financial instruments and markets.
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financial risk assessment and climate stress-testing, and financial regulators to identify the
drivers of climate-related financial instability and to design prudential measure to mitigate
it.
In this first part of the handbook we focus on the following CLIMAFIN’s characteristics:
• The information set that a rational risk averse investor should use to assess financial
risk under climate transition scenarios;
• The forward-looking climate transition risk scenarios and shocks and the transmission
channels through which they hit economic activities (low-carbon and carbon-intensive)
and firms’ profitability;
• The climate financial pricing models for climate scenarios adjusted counterparty risk
valuation for individual contracts (equity, corporate and sovereign bonds, loans);
• Climate scenarios conditional financial risk metrics such as the Climate Value at Risk
(Battiston et al. 2017) and the Climate Spread (Battiston and Monasterolo 2019);
• Climate Stress-testing models (see Battiston et al. 2017, Roncoroni et al. 2019). The
presentation of the Climate Stress-test and its applications to investors’ portfolios is
included in the second part of this Handbook.
The CLIMAFIN Handbook is organized as follows. Section 2.3 describes the information
set of a risk averse investor that aims to minimize climate risks in her portfolio. Section 3
describes the climate scenarios adjusted financial risk evaluation model for equity holdings.
Section 4 and Section 5 present the climate scenarios adjusted credit risk evaluation models
for corporate and sovereign bonds respectively. Section 6 introduces the Climate Spread
while Section 7 introduces the Climate Value-at-Risk.
2. Model component, investors’ information set and risk management strategy
2.1. Climate risk: not a Normal type of risk for financial actors
In this section we introduce the concepts of climate physical and transition risks, and
we discuss the main differences between the properties of climate risks and of the risks
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usually considered in finance.
2.1.1. Climate physical risks
Climate change physical risk refers to risk of damages to physical assets, natural capi-
tal and/or human lives resulting into output losses, as a result of climate induced weather
events. Based on the available scientific information, the Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emis-
sions trajectory currently followed by UN countries would lead to severe socio-economic
consequences, resulting in particular from sea level rise, icesheet and permafrost melting,
and the increased frequency of extreme weather events such as drought, floods and heat-
waves. These events will have economic consequences both at the firm and macroeconomic
level, and include:
• The destruction of immobilized productive capital, with negative implications on firms’
profitability, investments, employment and eventually on Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) (Burke et al. 2015, 2018, Hsiang et al. 2017);
• Drops in properties’ values (see e.g. the example of luxury coastal properties in Florida
and South Carolina, that would eventually become not insurable anymore, US 4th
Climate Assessment Report), with implications for banks and insurance companies;
• Loss of arable land productivity, with implications on food commodities’ production
and prices, and thus on famine and social unrest, and eventually the relocation of
millions of people currently living in areas particularly exposed to climate physical
risks, even within developed countries (FAO SOFA 2018, IPCC 2014).
2.1.2. Climate transition risks
Climate change transition risk refers instead to the risk arising from sudden assets’ values
adjustments and repricing as a result of coordination of expectations of market participants
about the implementation of climate policies (e.g. a carbon tax, or the revision of the
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) scheme in Europe). These adjustments are expected
to negatively impact the value of fossil fuels related assets (the so-called carbon stranded
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assets, see e.g. Leaton et al. 2012). They are also expected to impact indirectly the
value of assets in other sectors that use fossil fuel energy and electricity as a production
input, or that are involved in the value chain of companies that do it, thus generating
cascading losses. In addition, in today’s interconnected business and financial sectors, a
shock generated from an economic activity could cascade on the investor who is exposed
to the financial contracts issued by that activity. However, the sign of the impact can be
positive or negative, depending on whether firms are able to anticipate the policy and adapt
their business to alternative sources of energy (e.g. in certain scenarios, renewable-based
utilities or energy-intensive processes that manage to diversify their energy sources away
from fossil-fuels are expected to grow in market share).
Complexity of climate risks and limits of traditional financial pricing models
Climate risks are characterised by deep uncertainty, non-linearity, fat tailed distributions,
path-dependency and endogeneity. These characteristics, that we briefly outline below,
cannot be easily embedded in traditional financial pricing models that stand on assumptions
of Normally distributed shocks, perfect information, complete markets, absence of arbitrage
and short term valuation.
Non-linearity. Climate shocks probability distribution can’t be inferred from historical
data being forward-looking in nature. In addition, recent studies showed that past temper-
ature data are not normally distributed. For instance, Western European summer of 2003
was 5.4 above mean temperature for 1864-2000. Within a Normal distribution, 5.4 summer
would occur once every 30 million years. But Eastern Europe had similar heat wave in
2010. Thus, if such events happen every 7 years, temperatures are not normally distributed
(Ackerman 2017).
Deep uncertainty. The forecasts of climate change and its impact on humans and
ecosystems contain irreducible uncertainties because of the nature of the earth system, in-
cluding the presence of tail events (Weitzman 2009) and tipping points (Solomon ea. 2009),
which cannot be overcome by model consensus (Knutti 2010). This means that largest
shocks expected to occur in mid-to long-term but their exact localization and magnitude is
unknown.
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In addition, uncertainty characterises the costs and benefits estimates in each scenario
that vary substantially with the assumptions on agents’ utility function, future productivity
growth rate, and intertemporal discount rate. These assumptions, sometimes implicit or
given for granted in the mathematical treatment of economic agents’ behavior, ultimately
imply fundamental philosophical and ethical considerations (Nordhaus 2007; Stern 2008,
Ackerman et al. 2009, Stern 2013, Pyndick 2013).
Complexity. Even if costs and benefits could be predicted precisely, the likelihood of
the realization of a given pathway depends on the assumptions on agents’ rationality and on
the ability of countries to coordinate on international policies. The political economy of the
actors involved is complex and plays a fundamental role. However, this is not accounted for
by the literature on the social cost of carbon nor by the literature on Integrated Assessment
Models (IAMs). Endogeneity of risk. On the one hand, the likelihood of achieving climate
targets and the mitigation of climate risks in financial markets and investors’ portfolios
depends from the orderly introduction of climate policies and the scaling up of financial
investments in low-carbon sectors. However, the endogeneity between uncertainty of policy
decisions and annoucements and investors’ expectations on the financial risk deriving from
the policies generates the possibility of multiple equilibria. In this context, a rational agent
cannot identify a preferred investment strategy.
In this context, the standard approach to financial risk analysis, consisting of: identifying
the most likely scenario, computing expected values, and estimating financial risk based on
backward looking metrics and historical values of market prices, is not an adequate approach
(Battiston 2019).
2.2. Model components
We define and implement a model that is composed of the following:
• Definition of the investor’s portfolio of risky financial contracts;
• A discussion on the nature of climate risks considered;
• Macro-economic trajectories and climate transition risk at issuer/counterparty level;
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• A valuation model to price equity risk;
• A structural model to price credit risk;
• A model of forward-looking climate transition risk using the Climate Policy Shock
Scenarios from the Investor Information Set
• The definition of Climate Spread and Climate VaR
• The assessment of impact of Climate Policy Shocks on bonds default probability, Cli-
mate Spread, Portfolio Climate Value at Risk (VaR).
2.3. Investors’ information set
Building on Battiston and Monasterolo (2019) we consider a risk averse investor that aims
to assess the exposure of her portfolio to forward-looking climate transition risk in a context
of incomplete information and deep uncertainty (Keynes 1973, Knight 1921, Greenwald and
Stiglitz 1986, Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983).
We identify an Information Set relevant to climate transition risk, suitable for investor
that does not necessarily have a greening mandate but who does need to implement a finan-
cial valuation (risk) of its portfolio. We want to identify the properties of portfolio’s risk
management strategy accounting for investor’s risk aversion, counterparty risk, Probabil-
ity of Default (PD), Spread and Value-at-Risk (VaR) adjusted for forward-looking climate
transition risk scenarios. In this context, implementing the strategy requires to adjust the
traditional Probability of Default (PD), the Spread and VaR, conditional to forward-looking
Climate Policy Shock Scenarios (i.e. happening in the future).
The information set of the risk averse investor is composed of:
• A set of Climate Policy Scenarios Pl corresponding to GHG emission reduction target
across regions (B = Business-as-Usual):
ClimPolScen = {B,P1, ..., Pl, ..., PnScen}
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• A set of economic output trajectories for each country j, sector k under each scenario
Pl, estimated with each climate economic model Mm:
EconScen = {Y1,1,1,1, ..., Yj,k,Pl,Mm,...}
• A set of forward-looking Climate Policy Shock Scenarios (disorderly transition B →
Pl):
TranScen = {B → P1, ..., B → Pl, ..., B → PnScen}
• A set of Climate Policy Shocks on economic output for j, k under transition scenario
B → Pl, estimated with model Mm
EconShock = {..., Yj,k,Pl,Mm − Yj,k,B,Mm
Yj,k,B,Mm
, ...}
By defining the information set we want to:
• Include the current available knowledge about transition risk factors related to climate
change and climate change mitigation that can affect the investment value. We con-
sider the climate policy scenarios developed by the International Scientific Community
and reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Then, we
translate the economic trajectories for both low-carbon and carbon-intensive economic
activities obtained from climate economics models (e.g. Integrated Assessment Models
(IAM) as well as other models) into climate policy shocks on the Gross Value Added
(GVA) of those activities and firms.
• Cover a time horizons that is relevant both for investment strategies and for the low-
carbon transition, and ideally covers several decades, from 2020 to 2050 and possibly
beyond that.
• Include varying investor’s risk aversion preferences. We consider multiple scenarios
that account for different risk aversion and allow to go beyond the inadequate notion
of “most likely scenario” and include the notion of ”worst case scenarios”.
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• Compatible with the hypothesis of the possibly incomplete information and incomplete
markets (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986), the economic shocks led by a disorderly low-
carbon transition allow to model to be temporary out-of-equilibrium.
• Be relevant for institutions with a focus on financial risk valuation and financial sta-
bility mandate (thus, we do not assume financial actor’s mandate beyond risk).
2.4. Investors’ Climate Risk Management Strategy
The investor risk management strategy is based on the VaR and aims to minimize climate
risk in its portfolio by:
• Accounting for investor-specific risk aversion level (i.e. varying subsets of investor
information set InfoSetClimRisk).
• Accounting for counterparty risk adjusted for climate policy shock scenarios (e.g.
probability of default, spread)
• Accounting for metrics relevant for financial regulation e.g. risk measure such as VaR.
In this context, the risk averse investor aims to minimize her Climate Value-at-Risk
(Climate VaR) under the investor information set InfoSetClimRisk i.e. the forward-looking
climate policy shocks, the scenarios of economic trajectories for low-carbon and carbon-
intensive economic activities’ GVA, and the climate models (e.g. the IAM) used to estimate
the economic shock on GVAs.
The Climate VaR Management Strategy that aims to minimize the worst-case losses of
the portfolio across the forward-looking Climate Policy Shock Scenarios can be written as:
ClimVaRStr = min
Portfolios
{max
Shocks
{VaR(Ptfolio,Adj.PD |Policy Shock)}}
In this context, future asset prices are subject to shocks that depend on the issuer’s
future economic performance, the risk premia demanded by the market, as well as the timing
and magnitude of the climate policy introduced and the outcome of the energy transition
of individual firms and countries. The investor considers different feasible climate policy
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scenarios (but has no information on the probability associated) for which she can calculate
the impacts (negative or positive) on the market share of carbon-intensive or low-carbon
economic activities and firms.
The investor is subject to incomplete information on her (and competitors’) exposure to
risk stemming from a disordered transition from a climate policy scenario to another one,
uncertainty on the outcome of the firms and country’s energy transition, and no information
on the probability distribution. Thus, her risk management strategy is to consider a set of
feasible climate transition scenarios that her portfolio should withstand, and then compute
the VaR conditional to those scenarios.
2.5. Climate policy scenarios
With the aim to assess the impact of a disorderly low-carbon transition, i.e. forward-
looking climate policy shocks on the value of contracts of the investor’s portfolio, we consider
the climate policy scenarios of the IPCC 2014 report, described in .
(Source: IIASA, Kriegler et al. 2013) Characteristics of the mild and tight climate policy
scenarios considered in the LIMITS project
In particular, we select four climate policy scenarios aligned to the 2◦C target from the
LIMITS database of IAM and a baseline of no climate policy, described in Table 1. We
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use the LIMITS project database (Kriegler et al. 2013) to compute the trajectories of the
market shares for several variables including the output of primary energy from fossil fuel
and the output of secondary energy in the form of electricity both from fossil fuel sources
and renewable energy sources. Then, we estimate the effect of the introduction of market-
based climate policies (i.e. a carbon tax). The two emissions concentration targets chosen
under milder and tighter climate policy scenarios (i.e. 500 and the 450 ppm), determine the
amount of CO2 to be emitted in the atmosphere by 2100 consistently with the 2◦C aligned
IPCC scenarios (IPCC 2014). The 500 and 450 ppm scenarios are associated to a probability
of exceeding the 2◦C target by 35-59% and 20-41% respectively (Menishausen et al. 2009).
Thus, the choice of specific emissions concentration targets could be considered as a proxy
for the stringency of the global emission cap imposed by potential climate treaty.
A change in climate policy (i.e. in the value of the carbon tax every 5-years time step)
implies a change in the sectors’ macroeconomic trajectory, and thus a change in the market
share of primary and secondary energy sources. The shock in the market share could differ
in sign and magnitude depending on the scenario S, the region R, the model M used and
the sector S. We consider a shock occurring in 2030, affecting the market shares of the
economic activities and firms (low-carbon and carbon-intensive, see Figure 2.1) to which the
investor’s portfolio is exposed via financial contracts (equity, corporate and sovereign bonds,
loans).
2.6. Climate Policy Shocks
In the model,the climate and energy targets of each countries are assumed to be known
by the investor. These targets translate in a share of energy and electricity produced by
renewable energy sources.
However, for each country, the investor does not known if and when the country will
introduce climate policies to foster the alignment of the economy to its targets. She also
does not know along which economic trajectory, which means, the change in energy mix
of the economy that leads to a change in the market share of different renewable/fossil
sub-sectors of the economy and thus the revenues of the firms in those sectors.
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Climate policy shock 
scenario 
 
Climate 
policy 
scenario 
 
     Scenario Class Target by 2020   Target between 2020 and 
2100 
Not applicable Base No climate policy None None 
Disorderly switch from Base 
to RefPol-450 
RefPol-450 Countries 
Fragmented, 
Immediate Action 
Lenient 450 ppm: 2.8W/m2 in 2100, 
overshoot allowed 
Disorderly switch from Base 
to StrPol-450 
StrPol-450 Countries 
Fragmented, 
Immediate Action 
Strengthened 450 ppm: 2.8W/m2 in 2100, 
overshoot allowed 
Disorderly switch from Base 
to RefPol-500 
RefPol-500 Countries 
Fragmented, 
Immediate Action 
Lenient 500 ppm: 3.2W/m2 in 2100, 
overshoot allowed 
Disorderly switch from Base 
to StrPol-500 
StrPol-500 Countries 
Fragmented, 
Immediate Action 
Strengthened 500 ppm: 3.2W/m2 in 2100, 
overshoot allowed 
 
Table 1: Selected climate policy scenarios from the LIMITS database. The table shows the four climate
policy scenarios considered (plus the Base scenario), i.e. RefPol-450, RefPol-500, StrPol-450, StrPol-500.
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The investor does not have priors on the probability of these events and assumes that if
a country implements the low-carbon transition, then it does so by switching from its BAU
scenario to one of the climate policy scenarios described by the scientific community (i.e.
the energy and economic scenarios based on IEA roadmap and IPCC climate scenarios, see
Kriegler et al. 2013, IPCC 2014). This assumption is motivated by the fact that there is
policy and scientific consensus on these climate policy scenarios and their trajectories.
The transition of a country from the Business as Usual B to a climate policy scenario P
can occur orderly or disorderly.
Orderly, means here that the introduction of a climate policy is carried out timely
enough for the country to achieve its renewable energy targets and with a public and pre-
dictable schedule. In this scenario, investors can anticipate it and discount the effects on
asset prices of the economic activities affected. For instance, the phasing out of coal-based
electricity plants is announced to happen with a certain schedule, which is maintained and
the market players know that it will be maintained. Thus, they can discount the future
value of investments in assets that have these plants as underlying, accordingly, and they
can price the risk associated to their exposure to financial contracts related to those plants.
In contrast, disorderly means that the transition is carried out at a schedule that is
not predictable by markets and investors, e.g. the government introduces the climate policy
in a late and sudden way, or retroactively revise its policies. In this case, we assume that
the climate policy shock stemming from a disordered transition is not anticipated (despite
potentially expected) by the investor. This is due to the backward looking nature of the
benchmark considered by asset managers and on which asset managers’ performance (and
thus remuneration) is assessed. It is common knowledge that asset managers take investment
decisions based on the benchmark in their respective markets (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986).
Recent research shows that the market benchmark is carbon intensive (see e.g. Battiston
and Monasterolo 2019 for the case of corporate bonds market benchmark against which the
European Central Bank’s corporate bonds purchase (CSPP) has been assessed).
If the investor cannot anticipate the policy shock, then we can assume that she cannot
discount correctly the effect of a climate policy on the change in asset prices of the economic
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activities affected by the transition. A failure to anticipate the climate policy shock leads
to a failure in pricing it correctly. In turn, this has potentially severe implications on price
volatility, on portfolio’s performance and financial stability.
It is important to notice that the assessment of the policy shock could be incorrect even
on average across market participants. The motivation for considering this possibility is due
to the fact that several recent policy events (achievement of Paris Agreement, outcome of
US elections, the US withdrawal from Paris Agreement, Brexit, the outcome of 2018 Ital-
ian elections) have been incorrectly forecast by most observers and investors. Nevertheless,
these events and their incorrect pricing are having long-lasting economic effects (see e.g. the
spread on Italy’ sovereign bonds). This implies that these effects could not be priced in by
market participants, and this possibility should be considered in financial pricing models
of sovereign bonds. Since the experience shows that the possibility that markets do not
anticipate correctly policy events and their economic impact is material, we assume that the
investor wants to include this possibility among her scenarios. For instance, the phasing out
of coal based electricity plants could occur late on the policy agenda, behind the initially
announced schedule (e.g. in Poland), in a situation where market players are thinking that
it won’t happen any longer. This implies that they do not discount correctly the future
value of investments in the assets that have these plants as underlying.
Today, the information available to policy makers and market players on the trajectories
of future values of economic sectors’ market share comes mostly from Integrated Assessment
Models (IAM). These are (partial or general) equilibrium models, calibrated on the recent
state of the economy and climate targets, and provide trajectories in which the economy
remains in equilibrium along any given trajectory. Thus, moving from a BAU to a climate
policy scenario implies jumping from an equilibrium condition to another one. Moreover,
the levels of output of the sectors of the economy must be consistent one with each other to
reach again equilibrium conditions. The latter feature means that, for instance, a decrease
in electricity generation based on coal has to be compensated by an increase in generation
based on other sources to be consistent with the internal demand. This, in turn, affects the
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relative prices. Each trajectory is also consistent with a specific target in terms of GHG
by 2050, and with a specific scenario on the status of international coordination on climate
efforts. The trajectories integrate also the estimates of climate change damages to physical
assets in the economy by means of a climate module. There exists only a limited number (less
than 10) of established IAM in the world, run by independent and internationally recognized
scientific institutions. The models consider a common set of internationally agreed climate
policies and emissions scenarios but differ in the way they define certain output variables
and in the data used for the calibration (e.g. Kriegler et al. 2013). There is a consensus
in considering the IAMs’ set of trajectories as the information set available today about the
future economic impact of climate change. Nevertheless, it is increasingly recognized that
such models have some limitations (e.g. in the computation of the trajectories and outputs)
that relate to the model structure and behaviour, and can affect the policy relevance of the
outcomes (see e.g. Battiston and Monasterolo 2018).
2.7. Composition of the economy
We consider n countries j whose economy is composed of m economic sectors S. Eco-
nomic activities included in S are based on a refined classification of the Climate Policy Rel-
evant Sectors (CPRS), which was originally introduced in Battiston et al. (2017). NACE
codes (4 digits) are mapped to CPRS (2017), which identifies the main sectors that are
relevant for climate transition risk (fossil-fuel, electricity, energy-intensive, transportation,
buildings). CPRS classification departs from the NACE classification of economic sectors
(at 4 digit level) in so far, it catches the energy and electricity technology of the economic
activity. Its refinement (i.e. CPRS Rev2 2019) provides a more granular classification of the
economic activities in terms of technologies (utility—electricity—wind, solar, gas).
Within S, we focus on the fossil fuel and renewable energy primary and secondary sec-
tors and subsectors, due to the main role thy play in the low-carbon transition via the
energy and electricity supply along the value chain. Firms that compose economic sectors
S are considered as a portfolio of cash flows from fossil fuel and renewable energy activities.
The classification of countries and regions affected by the climate shock is based on the
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LIMITS/CD-LINKS aggregation, see Kriegler et al. (2013), McCollum et al. (2018).
Figure 2.1: Climate Policy Relevant Sectors. The figure shows the classification of economic activities by
different degrees of granularity by technology
In particular, we can define a set of issuers {1, ..., j, ...n} from economic sectors {1, ..., s, ..., nSect},
where the issuers’ GVA in a country is the sum of sectors’ contributions: GVAj =
∑
s GVAj,s
2.8. Impact of climate policy shock on economic activities’ GVA and profitability
We consider the contribution of issuer j’s to the sector S’s GVA and fiscal assets and how
this can be affected by changes in its economic performance, either negatively or positively.
We then relate the performance of the economic activity to the change in its market share
as a result of a disorderly climate policy transition scenario.
In a disorderly transition, a climate policy shock affects the performance of issuers in
sectors S via a change in economic activities’ market share, cash flows and profitability,
eventually affecting the GVA of the sector. The climate policy shock is calculated at the
sector, country and regional level. The country’s GVA composition is available at NACE
2 digit level from official statistics (e.g. Eurostat). Negative shocks result from the policy
impact on the GVA of sectors based on carbon-intensive (i.e. fossil fuels) technologies, while
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positive shocks result from the impact on the GVA of sectors based on low-carbon (i.e.
renewable energy) technologies.
We consider macroeconomic trajectories of output over time for sector s consistent with
climate policy scenario P ∈ {..., PRefPol, P 450, ...} The Climate Policy Shock Scenario
consists in the transition from a trajectory Business-as-usual (B) to trajectory with climate
policy P . Forward-looking climate policy shock arises from investors that are not fully
anticipating the introduction and impact of the climate policy (as an analogy, we can consider
the introduction/impact of Brexit). We focus on shocks on the GVA of 3 Climate Policy
Relevant Sectors (CPRS):
• primary energy fossil (PrFos)
• electricity fossil (ElFos) / renewable (ElRen)
uGVAj (P ) = u
GVA
j,PrFos(P )w
GVA
j,PrFos(B))+
uGVAj,ElFos(P )w
GVA
j,ElFos(B)) + u
GVA
j,ElRen(P )w
GVA
j,ElRen(B))
We assume that a % shock on output ≈ % shock on GVA, uGVAj , for each sector of j
u
GVA
j (P ) =
GVAj(P )−GVAj(B)
GVAj(B)
=
∑
s
(
GVAj,s(P )−GVAj,s(B)
GVAj,s(B)
GVAj,s(B)
GVAj(B)
)
u
GVA
j (P ) =
∑
s
(u
GVA
j,s (P ) w
GVA
j,s (B))
where then uGVAj,s (P ): GVA shock on sector s; w
GVA
j,s (B): share of GVA of sector s
From an accounting perspective, at the level of an individual firm, it holds true that a
decrease (increase) x in the market share translates in a relative decrease (increase) x in its
sales, as long as market conditions are the same1. Indeed, a body of empirical literature has
found a strong and positive relation between firms’ market-share and profitability (Szyman-
ski et al. 1993; Venkatraman et al. 1990). At similar argument can be made at the level
1More precisely, it holds under the conditions that total demand and prices remain unchanged in the
period considered, and that returns to scale are constant.
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of countries’ economic sectors, such as their utility sectors. A decrease (increase) x in the
market share in a given region of countries competing on the energy market translates in a
relative decrease (increase) x in its sales. As a result, there is a decrease (increase) in the
tax revenues that the sovereign issuer j collects from the firms operating in that sector in
its country.2 In the case of the energy and utility sectors, this argument is corroborated by
the fact that ownership is very concentrated in both fossil and renewable business. Indeed
in most EU countries there is just a major energy firm (e.g. OMV in Austria, ENI in Italy)
and one major utility firm.
The net effect of the change in energy mix on the profit of a given sector depends on
the pre-shock energy mix and the post-shock energy mix. For instance, sector Sj1 will have
a larger post-shock profit compared to Sj2 , denoted as pi(Sj1 , P ) > pi(Sj2 , P ), because it
starts from a larger pre-shock share of renewable-based power (everything else being equal).
Moreover, Sj2 ’s profit (summed over the two business lines) could decrease after the policy
shock, denoted as pi(Sj2 , P ) < pi(Sj2 , B), if it is not possible for Sj2 to more than compensate
on the renewable business line the losses on the fossil business line.
The final impact of the climate policy shock on the net fiscal assets of an issuer j depends
not only on the tax revenues from sector Sj and thus on its profit pi(Sj, P ), but also on the
expenses that the issuer incurs. If we consider j as a sovereign issuer, the consideration
discussed earlier in this section lead us to make the assumption that a relative change in the
market share of sector S within the country j, implies a proportional relative change in the
net fiscal assets of issuer j from sector S.
In the case of a sovereign issuer, we define the net fiscal assets related to sector S,
denoted as Aj(S), as the difference between accrued fiscal revenues from sector S and public
investments and subsidies granted by j to the same sector.
The impact of the market share shock (resulting from the policy shock P ) on net fiscal
assets of sector S is thus assumed to imply a change ∆Aj(S, P,M), estimated under model
2Notice that while the tax rate may vary in principle with firms’ size (e.g. total level of pre-tax profits),
in many cases large firms are subject to similar tax rates than smaller firms. Hence, agents assume that an
x% drop in firm’s profits implies the same x% drop in revenues.
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M , as follows:
∆Aj(S, P,M)
Aj(S)
= χS uj(S, P,M),
where χ denotes the elasticity of profitability with respect to the market share.
The forward-looking trajectories of sectors’ market shares are taken from the LIMITS
IAM scenario database (Kriegler ea. 2013), considering combinations of IAM M and four
climate policy scenarios P , characterized by different Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emissions
targets and way to achieve them 3.
Because, in general, the policy shock affects at the same time several sectors in the
economy of the issuer j, we have to consider the total net effect on the issuer’s net fiscal
assets as follows:
∆Aj(P,M)
Aj
=
∑
S
∆Aj(S, P,M)
Aj(S)
Aj(S)
Aj
=
∑
S
χS uj(S, P,M)
Aj(S)
Aj
,
In principle, in our approach, the elasticity coefficient could be estimated empirically for
the specific sectors of the sovereign issuers in the portfolio. In this work, the data to carry
out this estimation was not available. Being our goal to provide an estimation of the upper
bounds of the magnitude of the shocks due to a given climate policy scenarios P (see section
5), where the shock is transmitted to the value of the sovereign bond via the change in
sectors’ market share, GDP and fiscal assets, we have assumed a value of χ constant and
equal to 1 (typical empirical values range between 0.2 and 0.6).
3. Pricing climate risk in equity holdings
In this section, we focus on the risk-neutral valuation of equity holdings in sectors subject
to potential forward-looking climate policy shocks. We first derive the valuation formula in
the case where the timing and the characteristics of climate policy shock shock are known.
Then, we discuss how to extend the valuation model in the case in which the timing and
magnitude of the climate policy shock are subject to further uncertainty.
3See the LIMITS database documentation for more details https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/LIMITSDB/
static/download/LIMITS_overview_SOM_Study_Protocol_Final.pdf
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In the valuation model, t0 = 0 denotes the time at which valuation is carried out and E
denotes a generic equity contract. In absence of climate policy, we assume that all relevant
information is captured by expected future flow of dividends (div(t))t≥t0 and, following
Gordon’s formulation (Gordon 1959), we further consider that dividends grow at a constant
rate g(B) so that for all t ≥ t0, div(t+ 1) = (1 +g(B))div(t). Denoting by r the cost of risky
capital, the value of equity is then determined as the net present value of future dividends,
that is:
V B,t0E =
+∞∑
t=1
(1 + g(B))tdiv(t0)
(1 + r)t
=
div(B)(1 + g(B))
r − g(B) (1)
where div(B) = div(t0).
We then consider a situation where a climate policy shock is assumed to occur at time t∗
following which the dividend is assumed to shift to div(P ) and the growth rate of dividends
to g(P ) where P identifies a specific climate policy scenario. The value of equity is then
determined as
V P,t
∗
E =
t∗∑
t=1
(1 + g0)
tdiv(B)
(1 + r)t
+
+∞∑
t=t∗+1
(1 + g(P ))t−t
∗
div(P )
(1 + r)t
(2)
or equivalently
V P,t
∗
E = (1−
1 + g0
1 + r
)t
∗−t0 div(B)(1 + g(B))
r − g(B) +
1
(1 + r)t∗
div(P )(1 + g(P ))
r − g(P ) (3)
In particular, if the climate policy shock occurs at valuation time, i.e. t∗ = t0, we obtain
V P,t0E =
div(P )(1 + g(P ))
r − g(P ) (4)
In a climate policy scenario P , it is expected that div(P ) and g(P ) decrease for carbon-
intensive economic activities and increase for low-carbon economic activities. In sectors such
as energy production, where climate policy shocks induce substitution from high-carbon to
low-carbon sources, these impacts can be directly inferred from market shares under the
assumption that (i) the growth rate of total revenues in the sector (high-carbon plus low-
carbon) remain constant, (ii) the dividend to revenue ratio is similar across subsectors and
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(iii) dividends are proportional to market share. Indeed, one then has g(P ) = g(B), and
using the notations of the preceding section, one has (up to a discount factor if t∗ > t0):
div(P ) =
mE(S, P,M)
mE(S,B,M)
div(B). (5)
We further highlight two basic applications of our equity valuation methodology:
• The discontinuous change of valuation in the case of a disorderly transition occurring
at time t∗ is given by V B,t
∗
E − V P,t
∗
E .
• Given a probability distribution P on the time of occurrence and/or the impact of the
policy scenarios, one can compute the expected value and the value-at-risk or order
α associated to an equity contract respectively as
∫
V P,t0E dP(P, t0) and X such that
P(V P,t0E ≥ X) = 1− α.
4. Pricing climate transition risk in corporate bonds
We define here a model for counterparty valuation in the case of a corporate bonds issuer
and we define the default conditions and default probability.
4.1. Model for corporate bonds valuation
We consider a risky (defaultable) bond of corporate issuer j, issued at t0 with maturity
T . The bond value at T , with R bond Recovery Rate (i.e. % of notional recovered upon
default), and LGD Loss-Given-Default (i.e. % loss) can be defined as:
vj(T ) =
Rj = (1− LGDj) if j defaults (with prob. qj)1 else (with prob. 1− qj)
The expected value of bond’s payoff can then be written as:
E[vj] = (1− qj) + qj Rj = 1− qj (1−Rj) = 1− qj LGDj
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The bond price v∗j is equal to the bond discounted expected value, with yf risk-free rate.
The price defines implicitly the yield yj of bond j (under risk neutral measure) as follows:
v∗j = e
−yf T E[vj] = e−yf T (1− qjLGDj) = e−yj T
Finally, the bond spread can be defined as: sj = yj − yf , with e−sj T = 1− qj LGDj
An useful fact about spread is that:
sj ≈ 1
T
qj(1−Rj) = 1
T
qj LGDj(for small sj)
4.2. Corporate bond default conditions
We consider the corporate bond issuer i balance sheet: Aj(t0), Aj(T ) asset, with t0 issue
time andT maturity; Lj(T ) liability.
The default condition (e.g. following Merton 1974) reads as
Aj(T ) = Aj(t0)(1 + ηj(T )) < Lj(T )
with ηj(T ) ∈ R: idiosyncratic shock (e.g. firm j productivity), φ(η1, ..., ηj, ηn) joint
probability distribution (possibly correlated)
We add the climate policy shock ξj on j’s assets (as a “jump” up/down in the prob-
ability of default), assuming that the idiosyncratic shock ηj and the policy shock ξj are
independent.
We can then define the new default condition as:
Aj(T ) = Aj(t0)(1 + ηj(T ) + ξj(P )) < Lj(T )
⇐⇒ ηj(T ) ≤ θj(P ) = Lj(T )/Aj(t0)− 1− ξj(T, P )
with θj(P ) default threshold under scenario P and ξj(P ) the climate policy shock
can be either positive or negative (given the composition of j: ξj(P ) > −1), and possibly
correlated across j.
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4.3. Corporate default probability
We can define the default probability (PD) qj of issuer j under Climate Policy Sce-
nario P , with φP (ηj) being the probability distribution of the idiosyncratic shock ηj, ηinf
lower bound of distribution support:
qj(P ) = P(ηj < θj(P )) =
∫ θj(P )
ηinf
φP (ηj) dηj, We introduce now a proposition of the
PD adjustment ∆ under the climate policy shock following the intuition that frequent small
productivity shocks across time and firms occur in a similar way with/without climate policy
shock. Then, the policy shock shifts the probability distribution of the small productivity
shocks and thus the default probability of j.
We introduce the following assumption: the idiosyncratic shocks are independent from
policy shock, i.e. conditional to occurrence of ξj.
We obtain that the PD adjustment under policy shock scenario is:
∆qj(P ) = qj(P )− qj(B) =
∫ θj(P )
θj(B)
φ(ηj) dηj, with θj(P ) = θj(B)− ξj(P )
Then, assuming that the idiosynchratic shocks are independent from the policy shock,
and that the policy shock on assets is proportional to shock on GVA via elasticity ξj =
χj u
GVA
j (P ), we obtain that the adjustment ∆qj(P ) in default probability of j under Cli-
mate Policy Shock Scenario:
• Increases with GVA shock magnitude |uGVAj (P )| if uGVAj (P ) < 0, and decreases vicev-
ersa (under mild condition on φ);
• Is proportional to the GVA shocks on climate relevant sectors (in the limit of small
Climate Policy Shock):
∆qj(P ) ≈ −χj (uGVAj,PrFoswGVAj,PrFos + uGVAj,ElFoswGVAj,ElFos + uGVAj,ElRenwGVAj,ElRen).
Climate policy shock corporate bond value adjustment
Being ∆v∗j defined as the change in the discounted expected value of the corporate bond,
v∗j , conditional to a Climate Policy Shock Scenario B → P
∆v∗j = v
∗
j (qj(P )− v∗j (qj(B)) = −e−yf T ∆qj(P )LGDj
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Proposition: conditional to policy shock scenario B → P , and assuming everything else
the same regarding the issuer’s balance sheet, then the corporate bond value adjustment
∆v∗j (P ):
• Is negative and increases with magnitude of policy shock |ξj(P )| if ξj(P ) < 0;
• Is positive and increases with magnitude of policy shock if ξj(P ) > 0, with the con-
straint v∗j ≤ 1;
5. Pricing climate transition risk in sovereign bonds
We define here a model for counterparty valuation in the case of a sovereign bond issuer
and we define the default conditions and default probability.
5.1. Model for sovereign bonds valuation
We consider a risky (defaultable) bond of sovereign j, issued at t0 with maturity T . The
sovereign bond value at T , with R bond Recovery Rate (i.e. % of notional recovered upon
default), and LGD Loss-Given-Default (i.e. % loss) can be defined as:
vj(T ) =
Rj = (1− LGDj) if j defaults (with prob. qj)1 else (with prob. 1− qj)
The expected value of bond’s payoff can be defined then as:
E[vj] = (1− qj) + qj Rj = 1− qj (1−Rj) = 1− qj LGDj
The sovereign bond price v∗j can be defined as the bond discounted expected value, with
yf risk-free rate.
The price defines implicitly the yield yj of sovereing bond j (under risk neutral measure)
as follows:
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v∗j = e
−yf T E[vj] = e−yf T (1− qjLGDj) = e−yj T
Finally, the bond spread can be defined as: sj = yj − yf , with e−sj T = 1− qj LGDj
An useful fact about spread is that:
sj ≈ 1
T
qj(1−Rj) = 1
T
qj LGDj(for small sj)
5.2. Sovereign default conditions
Following a stream of literature (Gray et al. 2007), we model the payoff of the defaultable
sovereign bond as dependent on the ability of the sovereign to repay the debt out of its fiscal
revenues accrued until the maturity. More in detail, the balance sheet of the sovereign entity
is modelled as follows:
• Assets: net fiscal assets, i.e. the accrued value over time of tax revenues minus expen-
ditures such as investments and subsides;
• Liabilities: debt securities issued as sovereign bonds with the same maturity.
We have a sovereign i balance sheet defined as: Aj(t0), Aj(T ) net fiscal asset at t0 and
maturity; Lj(T ) liability.
The default condition (e.g. Gray-Merton-Bodie 2007) reads as:
Aj(T ) = Aj(t0)(1 + ηj(T )) < Lj(T )
[
We add then a climate policy shock ξj on j’s net fiscal assets (“jump” up/down), assuming
idiosyncratic shock ηj and policy shock ξj are independent.
The new sovereign default condition reads as:
Aj(T ) = Aj(t0)(1 + ηj(T ) + ξj(P )) < Lj(T )
⇐⇒ ηj(T ) ≤ θj(P ) = Lj(T )/Aj(t0)− 1− ξj(T, P )
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where θj(P ) is the default threshold under scenario P , ξj(P ) is the climate policy
shock from B to P (can be positive or negative), ξj(P ) > −1, possibly correlated across j.
Differently from Gray et al. 2007, we do not consider whether debt is issued in local or
foreign currency, and we do not consider exchange rate risk.
In the context of climate change, there is a consensus among scholars and practitioners on
the fact that markets and investors are not yet pricing in all the information available about
climate-related financial risks. Therefore, we relax the classic assumptions of efficient and
frictionless markets that is needed in the Merton model (Merton 1974) to solve the pricing
in closed form. Our goal here is to model the mechanism of the shock transmission channel
from fiscal revenue to the value of the sovereign bond, in a market that is non necessarily
efficient.
5.3. Sovereign default probability
We can define the Default probability PD qj of issuer j under Climate Policy Sce-
nario P , with φP (ηj) probability distribution of idiosyncratic shock ηj, ηinf lower bound of
distribution support:
qj(P ) = P(ηj < θj(P )) =
∫ θj(P )
ηinf
φP (ηj) dηj,
We introduce now a proposition of the PD adjustment ∆ under the climate policy shock
following the intuition that frequent small productivity shocks across time and firms occur
in a similar way with/without climate policy shock. Then, the policy shock shifts the
probability distribution of the small productivity shocks and thus the default probability of
issuer j.
We introduce the assumption that the idiosyncratic shocks are independent from policy
shock, i.e. conditional to occurrence of ξj.
And we obtain that the PD adjustment under policy shock scenario is:
∆qj(P ) = qj(P )− qj(B) =
∫ θj(P )
θj(B)
φ(ηj) dηj, with θj(P ) = θj(B)− ξj(P )
Then, assuming that:
• The idiosynchratic shocks are independent from the policy shock;
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• The policy shock on fiscal asset is proportional to shock on GVA via elasticity ξj =
χj u
GVA
j (P )
The adjustment ∆qj(P ) in default probability of sovereign j under Climate Policy Shock
Scenario:
• Increases with GVA shock magnitude |uGVAj (P )| if uGVAj (P ) < 0, and decreases vicev-
ersa (under mild condition on φ);
• Is proportional to the GVA shocks on climate relevant sectors (in the limit of small
Climate Policy Shock):
∆qj(P ) ≈ −χj (uGVAj,PrFoswGVAj,PrFos + uGVAj,ElFoswGVAj,ElFos + uGVAj,ElRenwGVAj,ElRen).
Climate policy shock sovereign bond value adjustment
Being ∆v∗j defined as the change in the discounted expected value of the bond, v
∗
j ,
conditional to a Climate Policy Shock Scenario B → P
∆v∗j = v
∗
j (qj(P )− v∗j (qj(B)) = −e−yf T ∆qj(P )LGDj
Proposition: conditional to policy shock scenario B → P , and assuming everything else
the same regarding the issuer’s balance sheet, then the bond value adjustment ∆v∗j (P ):
• Is negative and increases with magnitude of policy shock |ξj(P )| if ξj(P ) < 0;
• Is positive and increases with magnitude of policy shock if ξj(P ) > 0, with the con-
straint v∗j ≤ 1;
6. Climate Spread
The Climate spread ∆sj is defined as the change in the spread sj, conditional to
Climate Policy Shock Scenario
∆sj = sj(qj(P )− sj(qj(B))
Conditional to the climate policy shock scenario, the climate spread sj(P ):
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• Increases with magnitude of policy shock |ξj(P )| if ξj(P ) < 0;
• Decreases with magnitude of policy shock if ξj(P ) > 0;
• For small GVA shocks uGVAj (P ) it holds:
∆sj ≈− 1
T
χj ×
× (uGVAj,PrFoswGVAj,PrFos + uGVAj,ElFoswGVAj,ElFos + uGVAj,ElRenwGVAj,ElRen)
7. Investor and Portfolio Value-at-Risk and Climate Value-at-Risk
We can define an investor i’s portfolio value zi and portfolio rate of return pii at T , with
Wij amount (numeraire) of j’s bond purchased by i as:
zi(T ) =
∑
j
Wijvj(T ), pii =
zi(T )− zi(t0)
zi(t0)
.
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) on investor’s rate of return is the “worst case loss” at confi-
dence level CV aR. Given the probability distribution ψ(pii(T )),
the VaR = value of return pii (e.g. left tail) such that:
P{pii < VaR} =
∫ VaR
inf(pii)
pii ψi(pii) dpii = C
V aR
The Climate VaR is defined as the Value-at-Risk of the portfolio of the investor, con-
ditional to Climate Policy Shock Scenario with pi portfolio return, ψP (pi) distribution of
returns conditional to the climate policy shock:
ClimateVaR(P ) =
∫ ClimateVaR
inf(pi)
pi ψP (pi) dpi = C
V aR
.
Conditional to the policy shock scenario B → P , the ClimateVaR(P ):
• Increases with magnitude of policy shock |ξj(P )| if ξj(P ) < 0;
• Decreases with magnitude of policy shock if ξj(P ) > 0;
• Increases with marginal default probability adjustment ∆qj(P ) of bond j.
28
8. References
Ackerman, F. (2017). Worst-Case Economics: Extreme Events in Climate and Finance.
Anthem Press.
Battiston, S. (2019). The importance of being forward-looking: managing financial
stability in the face of climate risk. Financial Stability Review, (23), 39-48.
Battiston, S., Monasterolo, I. (2019). A Climate Risk Assessment of Sovereign Bonds’
Portfolio. Available at SSRN 3376218.
Battiston, S., Mandel, A., Monasterolo, I., Schu¨tze, F., Visentin, G. (2017). A Climate
Stress-test of the Financial System. Nature Climate Change, 7(4), 283–288. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3255
Carney, M. (2015). Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon–climate change and financial
stability. Speech given at Lloyd’s of London, 29, 220-230.
Gray, D. F., Merton, R. C., Bodie, Z. (2007). New framework for measuring and manag-
ing macrofinancial risk and financial stability (No. w13607). National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Greenwald, B. C., Stiglitz, J. E. (1986). Externalities in economies with imperfect infor-
mation and incomplete markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(2), 229-264.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014). Climate Change 2014 Syn-
thesis Report. Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Vol. 8 (A
Treatise on Probability). London: MacMillan for the Royal Economic Society.
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston: Houghton Miﬄin Co,
210-235.
Kriegler et al . (2013) What does the 2 C target imply for a global climate agreement
in 2020? The LIMITS study on Durban Platform scenarios. Climate Change Economics
4, 1340008.
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest
rates. The Journal of F inance, 29(2), 449-470.
Monasterolo, I., De Angelis, L. (2018). Are financial markets pricing carbon risks after
29
the Paris Agreement? An assessment of low-carbon and carbon-intensive stock market in-
dices. An Assessment of Low-Carbon and Carbon-Intensive Stock Market Indices (December
9, 2018).
Morana, C., Sbrana, G. (2018). Some financial implications of global warming: an
empirical assessment (Febr. 2018). Working Paper.
Nalebuff, B. J., Stiglitz, J. E. (1983). Information, competition, and markets. The
American Economic Review, 73(2), 278-283
Network for Greening the Financial System. (NGFS). Retrieved September 12, 2018,
from https://www.banque-france.fr/en/financial-stability/international-role/network-greening-
financial-system
Nordhaus (W. D.) (2007). A review of the Stern review on the economics of climate
change. Journal of economic literature, 45(3), 686-702.
Pindyck (R. S.) (2013). Climate change policy: what do the models tell us?. Journal of
Economic Literature, 51(3), 860-72.
Ramelli, S, A F Wagner, R J Zeckhauser, and A Ziegler (2018). Stock price rewards to
climate saints and sinners: Evidence from the Trump election. CEPR working paper 13206.
Roncoroni, A., Battiston, S., Escobar Farfan, L. O. L., Martinez-Jaramillo, S. (2019).
Climate risk and financial stability in the network of banks and investment funds. Under
review at Journal of F inancial Stability.
Solomon (S.), Plattner (G.-K.), Knutti (R.), and Friedlingstein (P.) (2009). Irreversible
climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions. PNAS 10, 2009 106 (6) 1704-1709;
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0812721106
Stern (N.) (2008). The economics of climate change. American Economic Review, 98(2),
1-37.
Steffen, W., Rockstro¨m, J., Richardson, K., Lenton, T. M., Folke, C., Liverman, D.,
. . . Schellnhuber, H. J. (2018). Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 115(33), 8252–8259. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810141115
Weitzman, M. L. (2009). On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic
climate change. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1), 1-19.
30
